Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior: Unintended Consequences and Undesirable Results by Curtis, Brandon
BYU Law Review
Volume 2015 | Issue 2 Article 8
March 2015
Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior:
Unintended Consequences and Undesirable
Results
Brandon Curtis
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Emergency and Disaster Management Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brandon Curtis, Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior: Unintended Consequences and Undesirable Results, 2015 BYU L. Rev. 503
(2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2015/iss2/8
CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015 3:53 PM 
  
503 
 
Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior: Unintended 
Consequences and Undesirable Results 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the maxim that natural disasters function as a great 
equalizer, Hurricane Katrina has reminded us that “natural disasters 
occur in the same social, historical, and political environment in 
which disparities . . . already exist.”1 The inequalities already present 
in Hurricane Katrina’s path were given a fiercer breath of life, 
disproportionately exacerbating the already dire circumstances of 
New Orleans’ most vulnerable populations. 
One such disparity became apparent when government officials 
began ordering mandatory evacuations. After experiencing 
Hurricane Georges in 1998 and Hurricane Ivan in 2004, emergency 
planners responsible for evacuating New Orleans were already aware 
of many of the risks facing vulnerable populations.2 For example, the 
“city already knew that at least ‘100,000 New Orleans Citizens [did] 
not have means of personal transportation’ to evacuate in case of a 
major storm.”3 Notwithstanding this knowledge, the city’s 
emergency plan had no solution for the evacuation problem and 
instead “called for thousands of the city’s most vulnerable population 
to be left behind.”4 In fact, “little attention was paid [during disaster 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Sandra Crouse Quinn, Hurricane Katrina: A Social and Public Health Disaster, 96 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 204, 204 (2006).  
 2. MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER, 
AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 4 (2006). 
 3. Id. (quoting City of New Orleans, City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS (2005), http://www.cityofno.com); see also 
Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) 
(statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman) (“The warnings of the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise that 
we have focused on in this Committee, that a hundred thousand people at least in New 
Orleans had no means to evacuate and that thousands more would be immobilized by 
infirmity or age, appear to have been received at all levels of government, but at all levels of 
government just about nothing was done about those warnings.”). 
 4. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 2.  
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planning meetings predating Katrina] to moving out New Orleans’ 
‘low-mobility’ population—the elderly, the infirm and the poor 
without cars or other means of fleeing the city.”5 
A 2005 post-Katrina survey confirmed these inadequacies, 
finding that, among respondents, forty-two percent of those who did 
not evacuate had no way to leave.6 Others reported that although 
they could have left, other circumstances, such as vulnerable loved 
ones, convinced them to stay behind.7 Despite these realities, many 
citizens and government officials blamed the victims for their 
misfortunes. One study found that the public characterized non-
evacuators as “passive (e.g., lazy, dependent), irresponsible (e.g., 
careless, negligent), and inflexible (e.g., stubborn, 
uncompromising).”8 These results come as no surprise in light of the 
government’s rhetoric concerning non-evacuation following the 
disaster. Michael Brown, the Federal Emergency Agency Director at 
the time, attributed the rising death toll in New Orleans to “people 
who . . . chose not to leave.”9 He explained, “[W]e’ve got to figure 
out some way to convince people that whenever warnings go out it’s 
for their own good.”10 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland 
Security, remarked, “[L]ocal and state officials called for a 
mandatory evacuation. Some people chose not to obey that order. 
That was a mistake on their part.”11 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 5. Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk but Not Levee Failure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/02/national/ 
nationalspecial/02response.html?hp&ex=1125633600&en=9ef3f7389573ef2a&ei=5094&par
tner=homepage&_r=0. 
 6. Mollyann Brodie et al., Experiences of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Houston 
Shelters: Implications for Future Planning, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1402, 1404–05 (2006). 
 7. Id. at 1404. 
 8. Nicole M. Stephens et al., Why Did They “Choose” to Stay? Perspectives of Hurricane 
Katrina Observers and Survivors, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 878, 880 (2009). 
 9. FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some Responsibility, CNN.COM (Sept. 1, 2005, 11:41 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/katrina.fema.brown/. 
 10. Id.  
 11. American Morning: Interview with Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff 
(CNN television broadcast Sept. 1, 2005) (quoted in Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The 
Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 463 
(2006)). 
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The public’s perception of non-evacuators, combined with 
comments from government officials,12 reflects the policy judgments 
many state legislatures have made and are beginning to make. Rick 
Santorum’s remark13 during a television interview is representative of 
the direction that many states have taken: “[Y]ou have people who 
don’t heed those warnings and then put people at risk as a result of 
not heeding those warnings. There may be a need to look at tougher 
penalties on those who decide to ride it out and understand that 
there are consequences to not leaving.”14 In the spirit of “tougher 
penalties,” several states have passed statutes that criminalize non-
evacuation, thereby subjecting violators of evacuation orders to 
potential incarceration and financial penalties. In light of the 
vulnerabilities common among non-evacuators, these criminalization 
and sanctioning policies are impractical and unjust, regardless of 
whether they are enforced. Further, many such statutes reflect an 
erroneous judgment that non-evacuators are blameworthy for their 
failure to comply. 
Part I of this Comment will examine the developing body of law 
aimed at curing the non-evacuation problem. In particular, this Part 
will address two criminal frameworks that state legislatures have 
employed to penalize non-evacuation: the traditional framework and 
the public welfare offense doctrine. Part II will look at specific state 
laws in an effort to categorize them within the traditional or public 
welfare offense framework. Part III will examine different 
enforcement regimes, namely arrest and relocation, prosecution, and 
symbolic impact. Part IV will consider the impact of mens rea upon 
those enforcement regimes, examine the class of offenders at risk 
under each regime, and argue that criminalizing non-evacuation is 
either ineffective in producing results or produces undesirable 
results. Part V will conclude. 
                                                                                                                                     
 12. See, e.g., id.; FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some Responsibility, supra note 9. 
 13. Santorum later said his remarks were only directed at those with resources to 
evacuate. See Carrie Budoff, Candidates Sling Barbs over Hurricane Remark, PHILLY.COM 
(Sept. 7, 2005), http://articles.philly.com/2005-09-07/news/25428468_1_jay-reiff-rick-
santorum-john-brabender. 
 14. Id. 
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW CRIMINALIZING NON-EVACUATION 
When a disaster occurs, state statutes typically grant the governor 
authority to declare a state of emergency.15 This declaration entitles 
the governor to a new set of emergency powers, including the power 
to issue evacuations. Statutes commonly grant the governor 
authority to “direct and compel evacuation.”16 Other statutes are 
more explicit and specify that the governor’s orders made in 
connection with the state of emergency have the “force and effect of 
law.”17 Regardless of the statutory language, the government’s power 
to issue an evacuation that legally obligates residents to leave the 
designated area has been established in a majority of states.18 
Although government officials have the power to order a 
mandatory evacuation, states have struggled to find the best method 
of enforcement. Some officials have expressed that mandatory 
evacuation orders are only valuable insofar as they impress the 
seriousness of danger upon the citizenry, while others have employed 
their state’s plenary power to physically remove noncompliant 
citizens. What is clear is that mandatory evacuation orders can serve 
a variety of functions, both symbolic and practical. While states have 
explored several approaches, including arresting and relocating 
residents by use of “reasonable force,”19 scare tactics,20 
                                                                                                                                     
 15. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-924(b)(1) (2005) (“The governor, upon finding 
that a disaster has occurred or that occurrence or the threat thereof is imminent, shall issue a 
proclamation declaring a state of disaster emergency.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.100(1) 
(LexisNexis 2013) (“In the event of the occurrence or threatened or impending occurrence of 
any of the situations or events contemplated by KRS 39A.010, 39A.020, or 39A.030, the 
Governor may declare, in writing, that a state of emergency exists.”). 
 16. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-1-440(a)(7) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724(a) (Supp. 2014). 
 18. Brenner M. Fissell, Taxpayers as Victims: Taxpayer Harm & Criminalization, 7 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 126, 143 (2013) (“My own state survey finds twenty-eight states with 
mandatory evacuation . . . .”).  
 19. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.185(b) (West 2012) (“A county judge or 
mayor of a municipality who orders the evacuation of an area stricken or threatened by a 
disaster by order may compel persons who remain in the evacuated area to leave and authorize 
the use of reasonable force to remove persons from the area.”). Constitutional challenges have 
been waged against statutes authorizing forcible removal, but the courts have upheld the 
states’ authority. See Reynolds v. New Orleans, 272 F. App’x 331 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Furthermore, this authority may have some strings attached. See Konie v. Louisiana, CIV. No. 
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criminalization,21 and civil liability for rescue,22 this Comment will 
focus on criminalization. 
A. Criminalization: Traditional Framework and Public Welfare Offense 
This Comment will discuss two theories governing conviction of 
non-evacuators: the traditional framework and public welfare 
offense doctrine. 
1. Traditional framework: actus reus and mens rea 
To fully assess an individual’s culpability for a criminal act, 
society traditionally “demands that an individual both make a wrong 
choice and commit a wrongful act.”23 In other words, society 
requires both an actus reus and mens rea. Actus reus, or the 
“comprehensive notion of act, harm, and its connecting link [of] 
causation,”24 is typically satisfied when one commits a voluntary act 
that in turn causes the proscribed harm. As one scholar put it, “actus 
express[es] the voluntary physical movement in the sense of conduct 
and reus express[es] the fact that this conduct results in a certain 
proscribed harm.”25 
Mens rea, on the other hand, requires that the actor have a 
criminal intent. While diverse language has been used to classify the 
varying levels of intent, the Model Penal Code has established four 
                                                                                                                                     
05-6310, 2010 WL 812980 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2010), for an example of how law 
enforcement was exposed to potential liability while enforcing mandatory evacuation orders in 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Forcible removal, to some extent, merges with criminalization. 
However, they will be treated separately for the purposes of this paper.  
 20. Amy L. Fairchild, James Colgrove & Marian Moser Jones, The Challenge of 
Mandatory Evacuation: Providing For and Deciding For, 25 HEALTH AFF. 958, 963 (2006) 
(“Local police have often asked those who refuse to evacuate for contact information for next 
of kin to impress on them the gravity of the risk they were assuming.”). 
 21. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-317(2) (West 2014). 
 22. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.185(d) (West 2014). 
 23. Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of “Willful” and the 
Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 397, 410 (1995). 
 24. Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 386 (1965). 
 25. Id. 
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broad and representative categories: purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence. Each category represents a 
“progressively less directed and intentional form of conduct.”26 
While purpose denotes “the intent to purposefully do an act, 
knowing that it is an unlawful act,”27 knowledge denotes the intent to 
do an act without knowledge of its unlawfulness.28 While recklessness 
denotes “gross disregard for a risk created by an actor’s conduct,”29 
negligence indicates that an actor failed to account for a risk he 
should have.30 
In the traditional framework, whether discussing actus reus or 
mens rea, choice is a primary consideration. In essence, “[i]n the 
absence of a wrong choice, the moral justification for refusing to 
respect a person’s liberty disappears.”31 Criminal excuses illustrate the 
impact choice can have on criminal liability. William Blackstone 
emphasized this principle when he said, “All the several pleas and 
excuses, which protect the committer[s] of a forbidden act from the 
punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to 
this single consideration, the want or defect of will.”32 What would 
otherwise be a convictable act is guarded from conviction when the 
actor’s conduct is not the product of choice. Put another way, one 
escapes liability when his outward act is beyond his control, such as a 
reflex, convulsion, or unconscious movement.33 Other defenses, such 
as self-defense, shield an actor from liability because the actor’s 
options are greatly limited, not because the actor has been deprived 
of choice.  The Model Penal Code commentators explained this 
rationale: “[L]aw is ineffective . . . if it imposes on the actor who has 
the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that his 
judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and could comply 
                                                                                                                                     
 26. Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, 
CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 28, 32. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Simonoff, supra note 23.  
 32. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20, *20. 
 33. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962).  
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with if their turn to face the problem should arise.”34 To some 
extent, the law’s effectiveness under the traditional framework 
depends on whether its standards account for the complexity of 
choice in an imperfect world. 
2. Public welfare offenses 
Public welfare offenses turn the traditional framework on its 
head. Rather than punishing an individual for a wrongful choice, 
public welfare offenses seek to punish offenders who commit a 
prohibited act. These offenses began to develop in the early 
twentieth century and were meaningfully explicated in a seminal 
1933 article by Francis Bowes Sayre.35 He argued that public welfare 
offenses reflect a judgment that social order often outweighs the 
importance of individual liberty, carry light penalties, and involve 
conduct for which evidence of the offender’s state of mind is 
particularly difficult to prove.36 The difficulty of proving state of 
mind arises especially where the circumstances “necessitate 
enforcement against such armies of offenders that to require proof of 
each individual’s intent would be virtually to prevent adequate 
enforcement.”37 The primary practical difference between the 
traditional framework and the public welfare offense doctrine is that 
the latter does not require proof of criminal intent.38 Such offenses 
                                                                                                                                     
 34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (“Proper Scope of Defense”). 
 35. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55–56 (1933). 
 36. Id. at 72. 
 37. Id. 
 38. With this definition, public welfare offenses begin to sound like strict liability 
offenses. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that public welfare offenses are not 
necessarily “[t]rue strict liability” offenses. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 
(1994) (“[W]e have avoided construing criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict 
liability. . . . True strict liability might suggest that the defendant need not know even that he 
was dealing with a dangerous item. Nevertheless, we have referred to public welfare offenses as 
‘dispensing with’ or ‘eliminating’ a mens rea requirement or ‘mental element[.]’ . . . While use 
of the term ‘strict liability’ is really a misnomer, we have interpreted statutes defining public 
welfare offenses to eliminate the requirement of mens rea; that is, the requirement of a ‘guilty 
mind’ with respect to an element of a crime. Under such statutes we have not required that the 
defendant know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense. Generally 
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criminalize the act itself without concern for whether the actor 
intentionally broke the law.39 
The question of whether a particular law operates under the 
traditional framework or the public welfare framework has, at times, 
been difficult for courts to resolve. The public welfare offense is 
commonly found in the void of legislative silence. Defining the 
criminal law is largely the province of states, but the Supreme Court 
has also provided guidance, especially when a law presents due 
process concerns. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
laid out a test for this question,40 it has examined the public welfare 
doctrine and suggested several factors to consider.41 In Morissette v. 
United States, for example, the Court undertook an extensive 
analysis of the public welfare offense’s evolution and character.42 The 
dispute arose when Morissette, a local fruit stand operator, trucker, 
and scrap iron collector, removed and converted used bomb casings 
from government-owned property.43 Although Morissette claimed to 
be operating under the belief that the casings had been abandoned, 
the government indicted and charged him with “‘unlawfully, wilfully 
and knowingly steal[ing] and convert[ing]’” U.S. government 
property.44 The trial court rejected Morissette’s defense outright and 
barred his attorney from introducing it altogether.45 Instead, it found 
that Morissette’s act spoke for itself: “‘The question on intent is 
whether or not he intended to take the property. He says he did. 
Therefore, . . . he is guilty . . . . [Felonious intent] is presumed by his 
                                                                                                                                     
speaking, such knowledge is necessary to establish mens rea, as is reflected in the maxim 
ignorantia facti excusat.”). 
 39. See Simonoff, supra note 23, at 409. 
 40. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (“Neither this Court nor, 
so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth 
comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and 
crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither 
settled nor static.”). 
 41. See, e.g., id. at 254–63; Staples, 511 U.S. at 604–20.  
 42. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250–63. 
 43. Id. at 247–48.  
 44. Id. at 248 (quoting language from the indictment). 
 45. Id. at 249.  
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own act.’”46 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding 
that the statute did not require criminal intent, an assumption the 
court gleaned from  Congress’s failure to “express such a requisite”47 
and Supreme Court precedent.48 
In analyzing the lower courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the development of the public welfare offense, contrasting 
that development against the historical, “universal and persistent”49 
presumption of a criminal intent requirement.50 Through this review, 
the Court outlined several characteristics of public welfare offenses: 
(1) they often punish acts of “neglect where the law requires care”;51 
(2) they are regulatory in nature, not originating in common law;52 
(3) they often “result in no direct or immediate injury to person or 
property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the 
law seeks to minimize”;53 (4) they offend the state’s authority by 
impairing its ability to efficiently maintain social order;54 (5) the 
injury is the same regardless of intent;55 (6) penalties are often 
                                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 249–250.  
 48. Id. at 250. The precedents the court of appeals relied on were United States v. 
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). Morissette, 
342 U.S. at 250. Of the rulings in these cases, the Supreme Court stated:  
In those cases this Court did construe mere omission from a criminal enactment of 
any mention of criminal intent as dispensing with it. If they be deemed precedents 
for principles of construction generally applicable to federal penal statutes, they 
authorize this conviction. Indeed, such adoption of the literal reasoning announced 
in those cases would do this and more—it would sweep out of all federal crimes, 
except when expressly preserved, the ancient requirement of a culpable state of 
mind. We think a résumé of their historical background is convincing that an effect 
has been ascribed to them more comprehensive than was contemplated and one 
inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.  
Id. 
 49. Id. at 250–51.  
 50. Id. at 250–63. 
 51. Id. at 255. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 256. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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relatively small;56 and (7) conviction does not gravely impair an 
offender’s reputation.57 Taking these factors into consideration, the 
Court held that the mere omission of intent from the statute did not 
justify eliminating the mens rea requirement, especially in light of 
larceny’s common law origins.58 
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to set firm criteria 
for evaluating the public welfare offense in Staples v. United States; 
however, the Court ultimately relied on the logic set forth in 
Morissette and refused to elaborate any definitive test.59 Despite this 
denial to further define the contours of the doctrine, many state 
courts have construed the Staples Court’s language into a multi-
factor test.60 The Staples factors these courts have identified largely 
overlap with the Morissette factors. Those that do not explicitly 
overlap are fairly intuitive and include “the extent to which a strict-
liability reading of the statute would encompass innocent conduct;” 
                                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. Others have distilled the factors defining public welfare offenses similarly. See, 
e.g., Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (“From these cases 
emerges the proposition that where a federal criminal statute omits mention of intent and 
where it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, 
under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person, 
where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the 
statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and where congressional purpose 
is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent.”); David P. 
Gold, Wildlife Protection and Public Welfare Doctrine, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 633, 640 
(2002) (“First, the crime is always a violation of a modern regulatory statute with little or no 
common law history. Second, the activity regulated by the statute is of such a nature that those 
engaging in it can reasonably be expected to take the precautions necessary to avoid violations. 
Third, conviction brings only minor penalties and little damage to the perpetrator’s reputation. 
Fourth, the statute would be unusually hard to enforce if specific intent were required.”). 
 58. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263–73.  
 59. 511 U.S. 600, 619–20 (1994). 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (listing the 
Staples factors as “(1) the background rules of the common law and its conventional mens rea 
requirement; (2) whether the crime can be characterized as a public welfare offense; (3) the 
extent to which a strict-liability reading of the statute would encompass innocent conduct; (4) 
the harshness of the penalty; (5) the seriousness of the harm to the public; (6) the ease or 
difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the true facts; (7) relieving the prosecution of time-
consuming and difficult proof of fault; and (8) the number of prosecutions expected”). 
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“relieving the prosecution of time-consuming and difficult proof of 
fault;” and “the number of prosecutions expected.”61 
While the traditional framework can largely be said to criminalize 
choice, the public welfare offense doctrine sanctions conduct, 
regardless of whether the conduct is the product of choice. The 
notion driving this policy is that preventing such conduct is so 
crucial to the public welfare that its value exceeds that of individual 
liberty. By enacting public welfare offenses, legislatures express a 
willingness to risk punishing non-culpable parties if, by doing so, 
they can decrease commission of the conduct.62 
II. STATE STATUTES CRIMINALIZING NON-EVACUATION 
Having outlined the characteristics of the traditional framework 
and public welfare offense doctrine, I now consider which framework 
statutes criminalizing non-evacuation behavior have adopted. While 
several states have enacted such statutes,63 there appears to be 
disagreement over the appropriate mens rea requirement. In this 
section, I will begin by discussing several state laws that have 
adopted the traditional framework, although with varying 
requirements of criminal intent. I will then analyze North Carolina’s 
law to determine whether it falls within the public welfare offense 
doctrine. North Carolina’s law deserves special attention because it 
appears to be an outlier as the only public welfare offense and may 
serve as a model if the criminalization of non-evacuation movement 
continues to gain traction. 
                                                                                                                                     
 61. See id.  
 62. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 422 n.108 (1993). 
 63. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405(3) (West 1981) (“A person who willfully 
disobeys or interferes with the implementation of a rule, order, or directive issued by the 
governor pursuant to this section is guilty of a misdemeanor”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-
19.31(h) (West 2013) (“Any person who violates any provision of an ordinance or a 
declaration enacted or declared pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class 2 
misdemeanor in accordance with G.S. 14-288.20A.”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(5) (McKinney 
2010) (“Any person who knowingly violates any local emergency order of a chief executive 
promulgated pursuant to this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.”). 
CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
514 
 
A. States Applying the Traditional Framework 
Several states have adopted the traditional framework to address 
the non-evacuation problem. For example, Utah’s law states that 
“[a] person may not refuse to comply with an order to evacuate . . . 
or refuse to comply with any other order issued by the governor in a 
state of an emergency . . . if notice of the order has been given to 
that person.”64 A person who violates an evacuation order “is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor.”65 The fact that the statute prohibits 
“refus[al]” and requires the violator to receive notice of the order66 
suggests that innocent and ignorant non-compliance is not 
punishable. At least some degree of mens rea must be established, 
placing Utah’s statute within the traditional framework. 
Furthermore, even absent a notice requirement, a general provision 
in Utah’s criminal code states that when the crime’s definition does 
not express a clear intent to impose strict liability, and “the definition 
of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state . . . intent, 
knowledge or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility.”67 Accordingly, the Utah statute clearly falls within the 
traditional framework.68 
Other states designate a more explicit level of culpability. For 
example, Michigan’s law states that a person must “willfully 
disobey[] or interfere[].”69 The plain meaning of willful may imply 
nothing more than intention, meaning the actor intended to act, but 
not to break the law.70 However, Michigan courts have suggested a 
                                                                                                                                     
 64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-317(1) (West 2014). 
 65. Id. § 76-8-317(2). 
 66. Id. § 76-8-317(1). 
 67. Due S., Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 197 P.3d 82, 94 (Utah 2008) 
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
 68. Also noteworthy is Utah Senator Mark B. Madsen’s recent proposal to amend this 
section to remove criminal liability. The amendment advocates allowing persons to stay in their 
home, but includes an explicit caveat that those who remain may not receive rescue aid timely 
or at all. See S.B. 273, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013). 
 69. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.405(3) (West 2014). 
 70. See Pavlov v. Cmty. Emergency Med. Serv., Inc., 491 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992) (citing McKimmy v. Conductors Protective Assurance Co., 235 N.W. 242, 242 
(1931)); see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 130 (2008). 
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higher standard associated with willfulness, requiring that the act be 
committed with “design and purpose.”71 The statute appears to be 
aimed at punishing choice, again falling within the traditional 
framework. New York, rather than requiring a willful violation, 
requires that the actor “knowingly” act.72 In People v. Shapiro, the 
New York Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he term ‘knowingly’ 
imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the act or 
omission a crime, and does not require knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of the act or omission.”73 Thus, New York’s law appears 
to require a mens rea similar to Utah’s in that both require notice or 
knowledge of the evacuation order, but not knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of non-compliance. 
B. North Carolina’s Public Welfare Offense 
North Carolina’s non-evacuation statute74 departs substantially 
from other state statutes in that it appears to be a public welfare 
offense, requiring no mens rea. State v. Watterson75 provides a 
roadmap for how North Carolina courts evaluate whether a state 
statute creates a public welfare offense. In that case, the court 
considered whether a statute, which made it “unlawful for any 
person to manufacture, assemble, possess, store, transport, sell, offer 
to sell, purchase, offer to purchase, deliver or give to another, or 
acquire any weapon of mass death and destruction[,]” created a 
public welfare offense.76 First, the court considered statutory 
language, asking whether, as a matter of construction, the language 
created a public welfare offense, taking into account its manifest 
purpose and design.77 Second, the court considered eight factors 
                                                                                                                                     
 71. Montgomery v. Muskegon Booming Co., 50 N.W. 729, 731 (Mich. 1891). 
 72. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(5) (McKinney 2014). 
 73. People v. Shapiro, 152 N.E.2d 65, 67 (N.Y. 1958). 
 74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.30(d), (h) (2013) (criminalizing non-compliance with 
evacuation orders). 
 75. State v. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).  
 76. Id. at 899 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.8(a) (2013)). 
 77. Id. at 900. 
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discussed in Staples v. United States.78 The court approached this 
second multi-factor inquiry with hesitation, noting that Staples 
involved a case of federal statutory interpretation, while the task 
presently before the court was to interpret a state statute.79 
Accordingly, the second inquiry was undertaken as a belt-and-
suspenders measure and does not appear to be a dispositive or 
necessary step. As discussed, these Staples factors largely resemble the 
Morissette factors.80 To fully consider the Morissette factors, while 
staying true to the Watterson analysis, I will consider both the 
Morissette factors, as well as the Staples factors insofar as they are not 
already covered in the Morissette analysis. To determine whether 
North Carolina’s non-evacuation statute creates a public welfare 
offense, this Section will first consider the statutory language, and 
then the substantive factors laid out in Morissette and Staples. 
1. The statutory language and context 
The North Carolina non-evacuation statute reads, in part, that 
“[a]ny person who violates any provision of a declaration or executive 
order issued pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class 2 
misdemeanor in accordance with G.S. 14-288.20A.”81 Notably, the 
legislature has omitted any reference to mens rea. The above-
referenced section, G.S. 14-288.20A, also neglects to reference mens 
rea for this violation. It lays out three crimes as follows: 
Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class 2 
misdemeanor: 
(1) Violates any provision of an ordinance or a declaration enacted 
or declared pursuant to G.S. 166A-19.31. 
(2) Violates any provision of a declaration or executive order issued 
pursuant to G.S. 166A-19.30. 
                                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. at 901 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–19 (1994). 
 79. Id. at 902 (citing State v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ohio 2000)).  
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.  
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.30(d) (2013). 
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(3) Willfully refuses to leave the building as directed in a 
Governor’s order issued pursuant to G.S. 166A-19.78.82 
The first and second subsections refer to violating evacuation 
orders issued by municipalities and governors, respectively.83 These 
orders involve evacuation from a stricken or threatened area.84 The 
third section, however, deals with the violation of a governor’s order 
to evacuate a building. While the first two subsections dealing with 
evacuations from stricken or threatened areas omit any mens rea 
requirement, the third subsection requires the actor to “willfully 
refuse[].” This contrast suggests that the legislature had culpability 
language within its vernacular, and that it made an explicit choice to 
not require culpability in the event of evacuating from a threatened 
or stricken area. This assumption is particularly appropriate in light 
of the fact that the supreme court of North Carolina has inferred a 
legislative intent to create a public welfare offense from similar 
statutory omissions.85 Furthermore, the Watterson court noted that 
“‘[w]hen a legislative body includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 
is generally presumed that [the legislative body] acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”86 
2. The Morissette and Staples factors 
The factors identified in Morissette and Staples also lend support 
to the proposition that North Carolina’s legislature intended to 
create a public welfare offense. This Section will consider (1) the 
                                                                                                                                     
 82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.20A (2013). 
 83. See id. §§ 166A-19.30(b)(1), -19.31(b)(1). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., Inc. v. George W. Thomas, Inc., 220 S.E.2d 
536, 542 (N.C. 1975) (noting that the driving regulation was “a safety statute enacted by the 
Legislature for the public’s common safety and welfare. The statute does not contain the 
words ‘knowingly,’ ‘willfully’ or any other words of like import. It was the obvious intent of 
the Legislature to make the performance of a specific act a criminal violation and to thereby 
place upon the individual the burden to know whether his conduct is within the 
statutory prohibition.”). 
 86. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 900 (quoting N. C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Hudson, 675 
S.E.2d 709, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Morissette factors, and (2) the non-duplicative Staples factors. The 
examination that follows is not intended to demonstrate that North 
Carolina’s statute should be a public welfare offense; rather, it is 
meant to discern whether it is reasonable to impute this intent 
upon the legislature in light of the characteristics the Supreme 
Court has identified. 
The first factor, whether the law seeks to punish neglect when 
care is required, supports this proposition. Non-evacuation, at least 
from a legal perspective, is the failure to act when the law requires 
action. Although the statute speaks in terms of the government 
official’s duty to direct and compel evacuation, the sanctioning 
power backing that order implies and imposes the duty upon those 
within the specified areas.87 
Secondly, Morissette emphasized that public welfare offenses tend 
to not have common law roots.88 Emergency powers are not the type 
of powers thought to originate in the common law. Such powers, 
especially the power to order evacuation of geographic regions, have 
developed to improve public safety as cities’ populations have 
increased. As Morrissette points out in its discussion of public welfare 
offenses, the “[c]ongestion of cities and crowding of quarters called 
for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times.”89 
Additionally, the Watterson court explained that the statutory article 
containing the weapons of mass destruction statute contained laws of 
a regulatory, rather than common law, nature.90 Significant for our 
purposes, the weapons of mass destruction statute at issue was and 
continues to be codified in the same article, Article 36A, as § 14-
288.20A, the statute criminalizing non-evacuation.91 As support for 
this proposition, the court referenced a general provision, Section 
14-288.3 of the North Carolina Code, which applied to all sections 
of Article 36A (including the non-evacuation section). 14-288.3 
                                                                                                                                     
 87. See § 166A-19.30. 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 52.  
 89. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952). 
 90. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 902. 
 91. Thus, both Sections 14-288.8 and 14-288.20A of the North Carolina Code are 
contained in Article 36A, entitled “Riots, Civil Disorders, and Emergencies.” N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 14-288.8, 14-288.20A (2013). 
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states that offenses within the Article are “intended to ‘supersede 
and extend the coverage’ of the common law.”92 The provision also 
states the Article is “intended to be supplementary and additional to 
the common law . . . .”93 Both the legislature and the court appear to 
regard offenses within Article 36A as reaching beyond the common 
law, and the court explicitly extends this rationale to justify finding a 
legislative intent to abrogate the common law presumption in favor 
of mens rea.94 
The third Morissette consideration, whether the act is designed to 
decrease the probability of danger or injury to person or property,95 
also favors labeling the law a public welfare offense. The idea of 
probability is often fundamental to an evacuation order. Whether or 
not the threat necessitating the evacuation will strike is often 
questionable, and whether those violating an evacuation order will 
suffer damage to property or person is also uncertain. This is evident 
from North Carolina’s statutory definition of “disaster declaration,” 
which provides that such a declaration is issued when the “the impact 
or anticipated impact of an emergency constitutes a disaster . . . .”96 
The fourth characteristic, that the regulated conduct offends 
state authority,97 also favors deeming the law a public welfare offense. 
This requires ascertaining the nature of the state’s authority and how 
non-evacuation offends that authority. First, North Carolina’s 
supreme court has succinctly explained the state’s relevant authority: 
“[T]he police power of the State may be exercised to enact laws, 
within constitutional limits, ‘to protect or promote the health, 
morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society.’”98 With this 
                                                                                                                                     
 92. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 902 (citing § 14-288.3). 
 93. § 14-288.3. 
 94. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 902.  
 95. See supra text accompanying note 53. This factor overlaps with the Staples factor 
requiring consideration of the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the true facts. 
Both involve the uncertain circumstances involved in evacuation.  
 96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.3(3) (2013) (emphasis added).  
 97. See supra text accompanying note 54. This factor essentially requires the same 
analysis as the Staples factor asking whether the crime can be characterized as a public 
welfare offense. 
 98. Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008) (quoting State v. 
Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C. 1949)). 
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power in mind, it is clear that non-evacuators could conceivably 
offend the state’s power to protect order, safety, and general welfare. 
For example, non-evacuators could impede the egress process, 
endangering themselves and others, or increase taxpayer burdens in 
the event of rescue. 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh Morissette characteristics also favor 
labeling the law a public welfare offense.99  The fifth factor, that 
harm is the same regardless of intent, is invariably true in the context 
of non-evacuation.100 Generally speaking, the threatening or 
damaging forces involved in emergency situations do not take the 
intent of a non-evacuator into account. Furthermore, rescue workers 
and taxpayers stand to suffer the same harm whether the individual 
willfully stays or is helplessly trapped, and this is the harm that 
proponents of the law primarily identify.101 The sixth factor, that 
penalties are often relatively small is also true in this case—the 
penalty for non-compliance is a Class 2 misdemeanor.102 The seventh 
characteristic, that conviction does not gravely impair an offender’s 
reputation, is also true of North Carolina’s law, at least insofar as it is 
a regulatory crime not associated with behavior traditionally 
perceived as immoral. 
The first non-duplicative Staples factor, “the extent to which a 
strict-liability reading of the statute would encompass innocent 
conduct,” is complicated in the non-evacuation context.103 The 
Watterson court gleaned this factor from language in Staples, which 
asked whether an illegally possessed item was sufficiently dangerous 
to put its owner on notice of the likelihood of regulation.104 By 
analogy, this factor may consider whether the geographical, 
                                                                                                                                     
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 55–57. 
 100. This factor overlaps with the Staples factor that considers the seriousness of the harm 
to the public.  
 101. See infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
 102. A class 2 misdemeanor in North Carolina imposes a maximum prison sentence of 6 
months and a maximum fine of $1,000. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–3(a)(2)(2014); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A–1340.23(2) (2014). 
        103. State v. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–19 (1994)). 
 104. Id. at 902–03. 
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meteorological, and social indicia of danger are likely to be 
sufficient to put the actor on notice of the likelihood of an 
evacuation order. Basically, the inquiry is whether a person, in the 
absence of actual knowledge of the evacuation order, should know 
from other alarming conditions that an evacuation order has been 
issued. This question is complicated because the prohibited 
conduct is behavior that citizens lawfully engage in on a daily 
basis—remaining in their home. But it is possible that general 
knowledge about threats inherent in an area’s geography (i.e., the 
presence of fault lines or low-lying land in a hurricane-prone area), 
combined with other warning signs, such as gloomy skies or 
packing neighbors, sufficiently puts residents on notice that an 
official has ordered evacuation. 
The second and third non-duplicative Staples factors weigh in 
favor of the public welfare offense classification.105 First, the statute 
relieves the prosecution of time-consuming and difficult proof of 
fault. Evidence is likely to be difficult to come by in the messy 
aftermath of a disaster, and the decision to not evacuate is 
particularly complicated. Offenders may blame late evacuation 
notices or insufficient state assistance. The public welfare framework 
would relieve the prosecutor of having to navigate through this series 
of scapegoating attempts.106 Second, assuming a prosecutor ever used 
the statute to penalize a non-evacuator, a vast number of offenders 
would fall within the statute’s reach.107 That no such prosecutions 
have been uncovered does not prove that the law will never be used 
in this way, especially since these laws are in their infancy. 
Having examined the legislature’s intent from a textual perspective 
and the Morissette and Staples factors, North Carolina’s evacuation 
                                                                                                                                     
        105. Id. at 901 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 604–19).   
 106. This is not to say that such “scapegoating attempts” could not amount to valid 
defenses. This is true regardless of whether the statute requires a mens rea element.  
 107. I have not found any cases involving criminal prosecution pursuant to a non-
evacuation statute. On WestlawNext, I searched all state and federal court databases with the 
following queries: “(emergency OR disaster) & ((evacuat! /s crim!)),” “(emergency OR 
disaster) & ((evacuat! /p crim!)),” and “(evacuat! /s crim!).” Similar efforts on popular search 
engines yielded similar results.  
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statute appears to create a public welfare offense, imposing criminal 
liability on non-evacuators without a mens rea requirement. 
C. Competing Interests 
A survey of the state statutes criminalizing non-evacuation 
demonstrates that legislatures around the country have made a wide 
range of differing policy judgments, stretching from willful, to 
knowing, to strict liability. 
At their core, the disparate mens rea requirements are the 
product of a calculus balancing individual liberty against public 
safety. When the mens rea standard is heightened, the legislature 
appears to be prioritizing individual liberty over public safety. 
Contrarily, when the mens rea standard is low or non-existent, the 
legislature appears to make the opposite judgment—that public 
safety, when compared to individual liberty, is a value more worthy 
of protection. 
III. THE INTERACTION OF ENFORCEMENT AND MENS REA 
The mens rea requirement affects how the law is enforced and 
whom it is enforced against. High mens rea requirements make the 
law more difficult to enforce and limit the kind of offender the law 
can reach.108 Because disasters and their accompanying evacuation 
orders typically affect a large group of people, the mens rea 
requirement is an important feature with serious potential to limit or 
expand the scope of enforcement and offenders. The evacuation 
order will apply to those who are wealthy and poor, prepared and 
unprepared, sick and healthy; some are entirely capable of coping 
with disasters and the evacuations that may accompany them, while 
others are helpless. In light of this interaction between mens rea and 
enforcement, this Part will address two questions: First, how are 
these laws enforced? Second, how do the disparate mens rea 
requirements impact that enforcement? 
                                                                                                                                     
 108. See generally Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 
415, 420–23 (2007). 
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A. Enforcement and Mens Rea 
Statutes criminalizing non-evacuation exist to serve one or more 
of the following purposes: justify the arrest and relocation of citizens, 
serve as grounds for prosecution, or operate as a symbolic expression 
of social norms. The purpose of this discussion is not only to explore 
the various ways the law can be enforced, but also to ascertain how 
the disparate mens rea requirements will affect the efficacy of these 
enforcement goals. 
1. Arrest and relocation 
To perform an arrest, an officer must have probable cause to 
believe that an individual has committed a crime.109 “If an officer has 
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a 
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without 
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”110 Because 
law enforcement is empowered to inform citizens of evacuation 
orders, mens rea is not likely to have an impact on the officer’s 
assessment of probable cause, even when the statute requires a willful 
violation. Essentially, the non-evacuator’s conduct becomes willful as 
soon as law enforcement informs him of his obligation to leave.111 
Accordingly, the mens rea requirement does not significantly affect 
the arrest and relocation objective. 
2. Criminal prosecution 
On the other hand, with respect to criminal indictment, the 
mens rea threshold has a significant impact on which offenders the 
statute will reach. Generally, mens rea is the most difficult element of 
a crime to prove—the higher the culpability, the more difficult it is 
                                                                                                                                     
 109. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 110. Id. at 354. 
 111. See, e.g., Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
“[p]olice have a hard time evaluating competing claims about motive; they are entitled to act 
on the basis of observable events and let courts resolve conflicts about mental states”). 
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to prove.112 States employing a willful standard impose a significant 
burden on prosecutors and increase the amount of resources 
required to secure conviction. The willful standard also safeguards 
liberty in that it requires the prosecutor to demonstrate that the 
unlawful act was the product of choice. Conversely, with respect to 
the public welfare offense, the prosecutor’s burden becomes 
relatively low. Just as a willful standard safeguards liberty, a public 
welfare offense loosens its protection of liberty in the interest of 
regulating and, presumably, protecting the public. 
3. Symbolic impact 
States may have no intention of enforcing statutes criminalizing 
non-evacuation. At the time of this writing, my survey has not 
uncovered any such prosecutions.113 Instead, these statutes may serve 
a symbolic purpose, solely intended to communicate social norms. 
The expressive theory of criminal law explains this symbolic impact. 
The expressive theory states that the law communicates social values, 
placing legislatures and courts in the position of shaping, defining, 
codifying, and/or disseminating norms.114 As the law becomes linked 
with norms, the cost of criminal conduct is not only punishment for 
law breaking, but also social condemnation for norm breaking.115 
The expressive function of law does not depend on enforcement, at 
least not in the sense that a violator must be sanctioned pursuant to a 
statute.116 Rather, law’s expressive function can operate independent 
of nominal enforcement, finding its power through the spontaneous 
processes of social perception, pressure, and condemnation. 
                                                                                                                                     
 112. Alun Griffiths, People v. Ryan: A Trap for the Unwary, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 
1014 (1995) (“Because a defendant’s mental state can be difficult to prove, a mens rea 
requirement places significant administrative and labor burdens on prosecutors and the judicial 
system.”). 
 113. See supra note 107.  
 114.  See Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive 
Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 423-29 (2011). 
 115. Id. at 420-21. 
 116. See, e.g., id. at 456-58 (finding “secondary [seatbelt] laws, despite having zero 
penalty for otherwise obedient drivers, have a large and significant impact on behavior”).  
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Furthermore, the law’s expressive power does not depend on a 
malum in se categorization. Traditionally, malum in se crimes attract 
the indignation of society because, in theory, they sanction conduct 
that is inherently repugnant. However, the expressive function 
demonstrates that even malum prohibitum crimes can attract 
condemnation. This is presumably because such crimes are enacted 
to serve public safety interests, and violators, by their unlawful 
conduct, exhibit a carelessness or indifference for others’ welfare that 
is socially reprehensible. 
It seems unlikely that mens rea requirements have any impact 
on the law’s symbolic value because symbolic value depends on 
the public’s perception of the law. Research suggests that an 
actor’s intent does not dictate the public’s perception of a crime’s 
seriousness; instead, whether the public views a crime as serious 
depends on the results of the action.117 For example, the Model 
Penal Code punishes attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy in the 
same way it punishes the completed offense.118 This is so because 
the intent of the actor is the same regardless of whether the result 
is accomplished. In contrast, the public does not believe that 
inchoate offenses are worthy of serious sanctions.119 Whereas the 
Model Penal Code punishes an actor’s intent, the public looks at 
the results of the conduct to evaluate the level of desert and the 
appropriateness of a serious sanction.120 While there are certainly 
exceptions to this rule, generally speaking, society cares more 
about harmful results than intent. 
IV. WHO ARE THE OFFENDERS? 
Having identified the impact mens rea has upon various 
enforcement regimes, this Section considers who will be 
                                                                                                                                     
 117. Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and 
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 56 (1997). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 
CRIME & JUST. 136 (1992)). 
 120. Id. 
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implicated under each enforcement regime. Whether the law will 
affect a given individual depends on several factors. To fully 
explore the implications of enforcement, three matters require 
examination. In section A, I will identify a potential class of 
offenders. In section B, I will identify who, among this class of 
offenders, would fall within the statutes under each enforcement 
regime described above, namely, arrest and relocation, 
prosecution, and symbolic function. Ultimately, I will 
demonstrate that the statutes create undesirable results. 
A. Who Are the Non-Evacuators, and Why Don’t They Evacuate? 
Several studies have sought to assess evacuation behavior, 
especially among those who remain behind.121 To paint a portrait of 
these individuals, researchers have tried to understand the factors 
affecting their decisions. Non-evacuators often consider factors such 
as the magnitude and proximity of the disaster, past encounters with 
disasters, vulnerability of dependents, and consistency and clarity of 
warnings.122 Other studies have taken a more nuanced approach, 
focusing on the impact social factors have on non-evacuation 
behavior. Such studies have helped bring to the forefront an 
unfortunate truth: for minority and impoverished communities, the 
choice not to evacuate is often not a choice at all. As far as criminal 
law is concerned, the nuanced justifications of non-evacuation do 
not affect liability unless they rise to the level of a viable defense. 
This occurs when justifications inhibit the agency of an actor so 
severely as to remove the element of choice from the equation 
altogether. For purposes of analyzing criminal liability, I will consider 
two classes of non-evacuators: First, there are those who choose not 
to evacuate, despite having a meaningful opportunity to do so 
(“Willful Stayers”). Second, there are those whose agency is 
                                                                                                                                     
 121. See, e.g., Earl J. Baker, Hurricane Evacuation Behavior, 9 INT’L J. MASS 
EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 287 (1991); Robert Bolin, Evacuation Behavior and Problems: 
Findings and Implications from the Research Literature, 2 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & 
DISASTERS 419 (1984); Keith Elder et al., African Americans’ Decisions Not to Evacuate New 
Orleans Before Hurricane Katrina: A Qualitative Study, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S124 (2007); 
Stephens, supra note 8. 
 122. See Elder, supra note 121, at S124.  
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inhibited to an extent that evacuation is impractical or impossible 
(“Vulnerable Stayers”).123 
It is unclear whether Willful Stayers account for a large portion 
of non-evacuators. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, official reports 
suggest that those who had the resources to leave largely did so.124 
But reports and responses from public officials,125 news media,126 and 
the public generally127 suggest that willful non-evacuation in the 
wake of a disaster is a significant problem. While these institutions’ 
perspectives often dominate, it is difficult to know to what extent 
                                                                                                                                     
 123. While this is undoubtedly an oversimplification, a simple model of a complex 
process can help “clarify our thinking and enable us to extract implications from admittedly 
oversimplified versions of reality.” See Ronald W. Perry, The Effects of Ethnicity on Evacuation 
Decision-Making, 9 INT’L J. OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 47, 48 (1991).  
 124. Michael Greenberger, Preparing Vulnerable Populations for a Disaster: Inner-City 
Emergency Preparedness - Who Should Take the Lead?, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 291, 
298–99 (2007) (citing A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN 
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE 
KATRINA, H.R. REP. NO. 109–377, AT 73 (2006), available at http:// 
www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/katrina/index.html) (“The Louisiana evacuation for the 
general population, including contraflow, worked very well. Governor Kathleen Babineaux 
Blanco and other state officials labeled the implementation of this evacuation as masterful and 
as one of the most successful emergency evacuations in history.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11 and 14. 
 126. Dr. Keith Ablow, Why Don’t People Evacuate When Sandy or Another Major Storm 
Looms? Are They Nuts? FOX NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/29/why-dont-people-evacuate-when-sandy-or-
another-major-storm-looms-are-nuts/; Melissa Dahl, Storm Psychology: Why Do Some People 
Stay Behind? NBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/storm-
psychology-why-do-some-people-stay-behind-971995; Timothy Dwyer & Michael A. Fletcher, 
Residents Stay Put, Despite Orders, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/07/AR2005090701309.html; Rick Jervis, Officials Fear 
Many Won’t Evacuate, USA TODAY (Oct. 28, 2012), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/28/hurricane-sandy-wont-
evacuate/1662755/; New Orleans will Force Evacuations, CNN.COM (Sept. 7, 2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/06/katrina.impact/. 
 127. See Stephens, supra note 8; see also Dahl, supra note 126 (noting the typical 
response website commenters had to non-evacuators: “What part of MANDATORY 
EVACUATION do these people NOT UNDERSTAND!” and “You were told to evacuate! 
Now you should be on your own and not expect others to put themselves in harms 
[sic] way!”). 
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their ideas are representative of non-evacuators generally. Judith N. 
Shklar explained, “Neither the facts nor their meaning will be 
experienced in the same way by the afflicted as by mere observers or 
by those who might have averted or mitigated the suffering. These 
people are too far apart to see things in the same way.”128 The fact 
that defining the willful non-evacuation problem is largely the 
province of observers may account for the overwhelming perception 
that non-evacuation is predominantly a meaningful choice. 
Notwithstanding uncertainty concerning the size of the problem, 
anecdotal evidence demonstrates that some people disobey 
evacuation orders willfully, choosing to ride out the storm. With 
respect to why Willful Stayers choose not to evacuate, it is sufficient 
to say that, while many are motivated by a sense of invulnerability, 
others often remain for compelling reasons. Take, for example, the 
Dresch family from Staten Island.129 When they evacuated for 
Hurricane Irene, they found their house looted upon their return 
days later.130 When Hurricane Sandy approached, Mr. and Ms. 
Dresch and their youngest daughter decided not to evacuate in order 
to protect their home.131 Waves overwhelmed their home, and water 
quickly filled the second floor.132 The roof caved in, and the house 
was washed away.133 Mr. Dresch and his daughter were found dead, 
with only Ms. Dresch surviving the ordeal.134 
On the one hand, this tragedy demonstrates that non-evacuation 
is sometimes the product of a meaningful choice. However, it also 
demonstrates how complicated that choice can be, even for those 
without circumstances conventionally perceived as vulnerable. The 
                                                                                                                                     
 128. Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23, 71, n.15 (2012) (quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF 
INJUSTICE 1 (1990)). 
 129. See Kia Gregory, After Tragic Loss During Hurricane Sandy, a Woman Chooses not to 
Return, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/ 
nyregion/after-tragic-loss-during-hurricane-sandy-a-woman-chooses-a-buyout.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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two categories I have outlined, Willful Stayers and Vulnerable 
Stayers, often overlap. Illustratively, the Dresch family’s vulnerability 
to looting induced their choice not to evacuate. By terming these 
individuals Willful Stayers, I do not mean to say that they are 
without vulnerability, only to say that their vulnerability does not 
unequivocally prevent them from evacuating of their own accord. 
The category I have termed Vulnerable Stayers deals with a 
more profound vulnerability, the kind that makes evacuation 
impractical or impossible. While government officials, the 
media, and the public often focus on Willful Stayers, social 
research has shown that such stories of purposefulness are 
often not representative, especially in the case of vulnerable 
citizens. In fact, vulnerable populations’ inability to comply 
with evacuation orders is not a new phenomenon. As early as 
1956, researchers detected different evacuation behavior 
among minorities. 135 In the 1970s, researchers began to focus 
more concertedly on “racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
differences in disaster response and recovery.”136 Since that 
time, extensive quantitative and statistical research has been 
published outlining the impact social characteristics have on 
disaster response.137 
Studies concerning disaster communication and response have 
found that “minority and low income households are less likely to 
receive . . . official disaster warnings,” which presumably include 
evacuation orders.138 In the event such warnings are received, these 
households are less likely than their higher income counterparts to 
believe them.139 Among those who take the warnings seriously, they are 
less likely to have the resources necessary to obey them.140 Hurricane 
Katrina is an apt example. In New Orleans, thousands who did not 
                                                                                                                                     
 135. Verchick, supra note 128, at 41. 
 136. Id. at 42. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Sammy Zahran, et al., Social Vulnerability and the Natural and Built Environment: 
A Model of Flood Casualties in Texas, 32 DISASTERS 537, 540 (2008). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
530 
 
evacuate had no access to private transportation, no financial resources 
to evacuate on their own, or no way to the leave the dangerous areas 
safely without additional assistance.141 Thus, this group’s ability to 
evacuate is inhibited by several factors including ignorance of orders, 
distrust of the message-giver, and insufficient resources. 
This group regards non-evacuation not as a choice but as the 
only action possible in its resource-limited circumstances.142 One 
study surveyed, among others, those who survived the storm—non-
evacuees, evacuees, and first responders.143 Researchers then divided 
their responses into one of three categories: “shared themes,” 
“[t]hemes significantly more common among leavers than among 
stayers,” and “[t]hemes significantly more common among stayers 
than among leavers.”144 Themes more common among stayers than 
leavers included the following: “I try not to let it get me down. I just 
let it make me stronger”; “We had a good community. All the people 
here help one another”; “The hand of God took care of me and 
that’s why whatever I do, wherever I go, I just trust in God”; and “I 
was worried . . . for a lot of people.”145 Upon analyzing these themes 
in their broad context, the researchers concluded, “understanding 
survivors’ actions requires realizing that what can be done is 
contingent on the resources that people have available to them.”146 
Many non-evacuators commonly emphasized personal strength, 
reliance on community, and faith in God because those were the 
resources available to them. Although other respondents—evacuees 
and first responders—found non-evacuees’ behavior transgressive,147 
                                                                                                                                     
 141. Greenberger, supra note 124, at 299–300; see also Elizabeth Fussell, Leaving New 
Orleans: Social Stratification, Networks, and Hurricane Evacuation, SOC. SCI. RES. COUNCIL 
(June 11, 2006), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Fussell/ (“New Orleanians’ plans for 
evacuation were strongly shaped by their income-level, age, access to information, access to 
private transportation, their physical mobility and health, their occupations and their social 
networks outside of the city. These social characteristics translated into distinct evacuation 
strategies for different sectors of the population.”). 
 142. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 885. 
 143. Id. at 879, 882. 
 144. Id. at 883 – 84.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 884 – 85.  
 147. Id. at 880. 
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non-evacuees regarded their own behavior as a product of their 
resource-limited circumstances.148 Evacuation, for one reason or 
another, was not or did not appear to be an option, so they did the 
best they could to cope with what seemed like the only rational 
alternative—staying. 
B. Who Is Guilty? Arrest, Prosecution, and Condemnation 
With the potential offenders in mind, I now turn to the question 
of who among these classes of offenders would be subject to criminal 
sanctions. The objective of this discussion is to determine whether 
the statutes’ sanctioning power is appropriately and desirably applied. 
By sanctions, I refer broadly to the three enforcement regimes 
discussed earlier: arrest and relocation, prosecution, and societal 
condemnation through criminal law’s expressive function. 
1. Arrest and relocation. 
Under the arrest and relocation enforcement objective, virtually 
every offender identified above would be affected. While statutes 
criminalizing non-evacuation give one basis for this authority, they 
are not the only basis. As the First Circuit has explained, “Almost 
every state in the United States has adopted statutes providing for 
the exercise of police powers in the event of an emergency or disaster 
(such as fire, flood, tornado, hurricane, etc.).”149 Such statutes do 
not typically allocate criminal liability, but express or imply the state’s 
powers to protect the public.150 The authority to seize and relocate 
citizens does not require reasonable suspicion that a crime has been 
committed; rather, the authority is implied from broader statutory 
                                                                                                                                     
 148. Id. at 885. 
 149. Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 258 (1st Cir. 2003). 
The Court goes further and cites approvingly an inference of an Ohio statute stating an officer 
“may, in a reasonable manner, remove to a safe area any persons who refuse to evacuate 
voluntarily.” See id. (quoting 1987 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 99). Furthermore, the Court 
states, “We have no doubts about the constitutionality of such authority.” Id. at 258 n.9. 
 150. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724(C)(3) (2007) (granting power to “[c]ontrol 
ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area, and 
the occupancy of premises therein”). 
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authorizations.151 Seizure and relocation would exist even if the state 
did not make non-compliance criminal. For example, Texas’s 
recently enacted statute explicitly lays out this authority to seize and 
relocate but does so without defining a criminal offense.152 
Although the criminal law is not the only enabler of the seize and 
relocate enforcement option, it provides an unequivocal basis for the 
option and, therefore, deserves some discussion. Since the law 
establishes a legal basis for arresting citizens, the question becomes 
whether the state or municipality should use this authority. In a 
House of Representatives bipartisan committee meeting following 
Hurricane Katrina, Governor Blanco argued that “evacuation at 
‘gunpoint’ [is] unjustified . . . and impractical.”153 Both of these 
adjectives invite discussion. 
a. Unjustified. The position that arrest and relocation is 
unjustified is largely premised on Americans’ deep-rooted reverence 
for property rights. One author observed how forcible eviction 
threatens these rights: 
[F]orcible eviction appears to be another symptom of the disease 
manifest in society in the form of rapidly eroding property rights. 
The government’s ability to oust citizens from their homes to build 
shopping malls and business districts and, now, to remove citizens 
from private residences when it believes it should, begs the 
question of whether private property rights are merely illusory.154 
The importance of property rights is often heightened in the 
midst of disaster scenarios. Concerns regarding looting arise.155 
Those who are forced from their homes may be restricted from 
returning for a long period of time, an inconvenience that delays the 
                                                                                                                                     
 151. See, e.g., Konie v. Louisiana, CIV.A. 05-6310, 2010 WL 812980 (explaining the 
allegations of a woman who was arrested for violating a mandatory evacuation order, even 
though Louisiana had not statutorily criminalized the conduct). 
 152. See supra note 19.  
 153. See Fairchild, supra note 20, at 961.  
 154. Jonathan Jorissen, Katrina’s House: The Constitutionality of the Forced Removal of 
Citizens from Their Homes in the Wake of Natural Disasters, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 587, 
606 (2007). 
 155. Id. at 606 – 07. 
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individual recovery process.156 There are also more fundamental 
property concerns, namely, whether the property will be able to 
withstand the disaster at all. 
Alternatively, governments assert that evacuation orders are 
justified to protect citizens, to improve clean-up efforts, and to 
maintain order.157 In this context, governments play a paternalistic 
role, acting to protect citizens from danger, including danger from 
themselves.158 Such paternalistic laws are rampant in today’s society 
and include legislation involving seat belts, smoking, and illegal 
drugs.159 While laws dealing with seat belts, smoking, and the like 
involve restricting privileges, mandatory evacuation involves 
restricting constitutional rights.160 For the state to justify revoking 
such a fundamental right, its interest must be far more compelling 
than the “potential for disease” or the “desire for orderly clean-
up.”161 Upon this basis, arrest and relocation are unjustified. 
b. Impractical. Arrest and relocation are impractical, as well. The 
number of law enforcement officers required to remove all non-
evacuators from their homes would be overwhelming. Even if 
adequate law enforcement could be mustered to accomplish the task, 
there is a significant question about whether this would be a prudent 
use of resources. States apparently recognize the impracticality of 
such a maneuver since, in reality, arrests have typically been limited 
to special circumstances and violations.162 Even in those limited 
circumstances, arresting one hubristic non-evacuator may come at 
the expense of aiding another who desperately needs assistance. 
There are too many Vulnerable Stayers for the state to conscionably 
pursue the Willful Stayers. 
                                                                                                                                     
 156. Id. at 607. 
 157. Id. at 604.  
 158. Id. at 602.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 602 – 04. 
 161. Id. at 604. 
 162. Amy L. Fairchild et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Mandatory Hurricane 
Evacuation, NAT’L CENTER FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 17 (Oct. 2006), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15773. 
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While the arrest and relocation objective may serve a valid 
purpose in a narrow set of circumstances, it is largely unjustified and 
impractical. Furthermore, states can empower law enforcement to 
seize and relocate citizens without codifying a crime through its 
police power. Because of the negative effects that come with 
criminalization, states desiring to use this authority should 
implement it through other statutory means. 
2. Prosecution 
Whether a given offender would be subject to prosecution 
depends on the mens rea threshold the jurisdiction requires. Because 
I am discussing non-evacuators, the mens rea is the only element at 
issue.163 For illustrative purposes, I will examine the offenders under 
two different mens rea regimes: willful and public welfare offense. 
a. Willful. Under a willful regime, all offenders who had 
knowledge of the mandatory evacuation order and its legal import 
would be subject to criminal prosecution. On its face, the willful 
statutes could implicate both Willful and Vulnerable Stayers; 
however, it is less likely to reach Vulnerable Stayers in light of the 
fact that such non-evacuees are less likely to have notice of the 
orders.164 Accordingly, at first glance, this seems an appropriate 
course of action. It’s not hard to imagine a scenario where an 
individual refuses to evacuate, requires rescue, jeopardizes the lives of 
rescue workers, and is issued criminal sanctions for disobeying 
evacuation orders. Society at large would likely be comfortable with 
this result as it comports with our values of desert and 
blameworthiness. The common sentiment, “What part of 
MANDATORY EVACUATION do these people NOT 
UNDERSTAND,”165 would be vindicated. 
                                                                                                                                     
 163. Non-evacuators have already committed the actus reus by not evacuating.  
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41.  
 165. See supra note 126. 
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But these blanket assertions ignore harsh realities. Recall the 
Dresch family, for example.166 Should Ms. Dresch, as the only member 
of her family to survive, be subject to criminal sanctions? Although no 
reasonable citizen would condone this result, she would nevertheless 
likely satisfy the elements of the crime.167 But rather than receiving 
criminal sanctions, Ms. Dresch attended a news conference at Staten 
Island Borough Hall with New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
and other officials.168 There, she was introduced as the first 
homeowner to be bought out pursuant to New York City’s Hurricane 
Sandy recovery program.169 Viewing this transaction through a 
criminal law lens, it becomes one where criminal behavior inspires 
mayoral sympathy and government assistance. In reality, both the man 
requiring rescue and Ms. Dresch made the same choice in the eyes of 
the law, but for this law to operate in a way that comports with social 
conscience, the legislature would need to write in an arbitrary 
exclusion for those that arouse sympathy. 
This anecdote reveals a great deal about the desirability of a 
statute criminalizing willful non-evacuation. First, it shows that the 
traditional framework may not be an appropriate vehicle for treating 
the non-evacuation problem. The traditional framework cannot 
function without blame. But when society learns the facts, when 
individuals become something more than uninformed observers, 
willful non-evacuation often loses its power to inspire feelings of 
desert. This occurs not only when tragic results befall victims, but 
also when the choice to not evacuate is complicated. Sympathy is not 
the only thing mitigating society’s need to punish. The mitigation 
also stems from the “universal and persistent” belief that the law 
                                                                                                                                     
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 129–34. 
 167. The particular law that the Dresch family would have been subjected to only 
required a knowing violation. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(5) (McKinney 2014). The law became 
effective on March 30, 2012, and Hurricane Sandy made landfall in October of that year. 
While it is difficult to ascertain whether the family knew non-evacuation was illegal, it appears 
they at least had sufficient knowledge of the order to satisfy the knowing standard they would 
be held to.  
 168. Gregory, supra note 129. 
 169. Id. 
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should only punish a blamable choice.170 On the one hand, the 
choice may fail to inspire blameworthiness because a reasonable 
person in the same circumstance would have weighed the risks 
similarly. On the other hand, the choice may not be perceived as a 
choice, but an unavoidable course of action taken to preserve or 
protect an important right or resource. 
Secondly, this example reveals the illogic of blaming and 
punishing victims.171 Failing to evacuate often brings about terrible 
consequences. Accordingly, these laws threaten to place even more 
burden on those who have already suffered the toll of disaster.172 By 
assigning blame to disaster victims, these laws have the potential of 
distracting authorities from what the victims really need—help. 
Blaming the victim relieves other accountable players from taking 
responsibility.173 This practice of shifting blame is not new: “When 
millions perished in Bengal’s 1943 famine, Winston Churchill 
scandalously blamed Indians for ‘breeding like rabbits,’ instead of 
admitting his government’s incompetence.”174 Furthermore, as 
discussed above,175 when “federally maintained levees burst and 
drowned the Crescent City, beset victims were forced to swallow a 
torrent of blame from moralizing Congressmen and agency 
officials.”176 Assigning culpability to the evacuation choice, as the 
traditional framework does, is perhaps worse than these sporadic, 
                                                                                                                                     
 170. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
 171. See generally Fussell, supra note 141 (citing WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM 
(1976)) (“One fundamental insight of social science is to understand the illogic of blaming 
the victim.”). 
 172. To give the legislature the benefit of the doubt, it is possible that these laws were 
enacted to deter non-evacuation behavior, rather than punish it. If such is the case, New York’s 
most recent hurricane activity suggests that the laws fail to achieve this objective. See infra text 
accompanying notes 184–86. 
 173. See SHKLAR, supra note 128, at 60 (“Next to guilt, the most truly unjust and 
unwarranted response to accidents and disasters is scapegoating . . . .”). 
 174. Verchick, supra note 128, at 55 (quoting MADHUSREE MUKERJEE, CHURCHILL’S 
SECRET WAR 205 (2010)). 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 9–14. 
 176. Verchick, supra note 128, at 55 (citing FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some 
Responsibility, supra note 9; Arizona Talk Radio Brings You Some Kindly 
Compassion, AZCENTRAL.COM (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic 
/local/articles/0904polinsider04.html). 
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insensitive remarks, for it represents a systematic process of 
misapplied scapegoating that parades under the guise of legal 
legitimacy. Prosecuting willful violators produces undesirable results 
by assigning blame to those already burdened and excusing other 
accountable parties from taking responsibility. 
b. Public welfare offense. Under a public welfare offense regime, 
all offenders, regardless of knowledge, intent, or resources, would be 
subject to criminal prosecution. Thus, the law would even punish 
Vulnerable Stayers who don’t receive notice of orders or otherwise 
lack means to obey. The injustice of such a practice is astounding, so 
much so that it seems particularly unlikely that society would 
condone such prosecutions. In fact, as of this writing, I have not 
uncovered a prosecution premised on the violation of a non-
evacuation statute.177 
However, a statute that disproportionately incriminates 
vulnerable populations is not made valid by its dormancy. If this 
sleeping giant is awakened by making non-evacuation a public 
welfare offense, the legislature has not only secured penalties for 
Willful Stayers, but also, and perhaps especially, for its 
underprivileged citizens. The offense is premised on the idea that 
punishing innocence may occur: “the interest of the enforcement for 
the public health and safety requires the risk that an occasional non-
offender may be punished in order to prevent the escape of a greater 
number of culpable offenders.”178 
Rather than seeking to affix blame, public welfare offenses seek 
to prevent a public harm the regulated activity causes. If the conduct 
does not cause harm that the regulation is capable of avoiding or 
mitigating, it is difficult to affix a purpose to that regulation or call it 
good policy. To ascertain whether prosecution premised on non-
evacuation would serve the ends of the public welfare offense, the 
following discussion will seek to establish what type of harm non-
evacuation creates and whether criminalization is an appropriate 
method for mitigating or preventing that harm. 
                                                                                                                                     
 177. See supra text accompanying note 107.  
 178. Levenson, supra note 62 (citing People v. Travers, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (1975)) 
(emphasis removed). 
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Non-evacuation harm can be divided into two categories: harm 
to others and harm to self. The harm principle is the most common 
rationale for criminalizing conduct. John Stuart Mills explained that 
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.”179 The primary threat persistently identified in the 
non-evacuation context, endangering first responders, is a classic 
application of the harm principle.180 The other threat non-evacuators 
create is not to the public, but to themselves.181 Paternalism describes 
the body of law designed to prohibit such self-harm.182 Soft 
paternalism prohibits conduct in areas “where the individual has 
assumed a risk without adequate information, without sufficient 
maturity, or without adequate freedom from coercion.”183 Hard 
paternalism, however, goes further and prohibits conduct that is 
both “informed and voluntary.”184 Statutes criminalizing non-
evacuation more accurately fall within the soft paternalism category. 
The paternalistic statute operates on the assumption that individuals 
are, on the whole, unable to acquire all relevant information, 
rationally process that information, or both. The law assumes that 
the public official, however, is capable of such a task and, therefore, 
shifts the duty to him. Thus, if an offender disregards a gubernatorial 
or municipal evacuation order, he is, in effect, demonstrating his 
“[in]sufficient maturity” by disrespecting the legislature’s delegation 
of that decision-making right.185 
                                                                                                                                     
 179. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The 
Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 434 (2000) (quoting JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin ed., 1974) (1859)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Fairchild, et al., supra note 20, at 958–59; see also Fissell, supra note 18, at 143 (“It 
is not hard to imagine that a homeowner might, upon hearing the warnings, be so adequately 
prepared for a disaster that his decision to leave or stay has absolutely no impact upon anyone 
but himself, or in the alternative, that one might accept the risk and not ask for rescue, thus 
incurring no costs.”). 
 182. Pope, supra note 179, at 429. Importantly, “in reality most intervention is ‘impure’ 
paternalism, that is, it is for the good of the individual and also of others.” Id. at 454–55. 
 183. Id. at 429–30. 
 184. Id. at 430. 
 185. There is a substantial question about whether the paternalism philosophy has any 
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Criminalizing non-evacuation is ultimately bad policy. There is 
no indication that first responder harm is somehow more 
extraordinary in the non-evacuation context than it is in other 
scenarios where first responders are called upon. As in all first 
responder operations, if the circumstances surrounding a rescue 
request are so severe as to make the operation impractical or 
impossible, it will not be attempted. Also, those who do receive 
assistance are doing no more than asking first responders to perform 
duties within their job description. The risks non-evacuators create 
for first responders are typical of those risks first responders regularly 
encounter. If legislatures criminalize one activity on the basis that it 
requires first responders to perform their duties, why not criminalize 
all activities that prompt emergency response? The answer that 
policymakers seem to rely upon is that non-evacuators are more 
culpable for putting first responders at risk. But, as this Comment 
demonstrates, the difference between non-evacuators and other 
victims of disaster is slight, if not nil. It is certainly insufficient to 
justify criminalization. 
Furthermore, if the harm is to justify the means, the means 
ought to diminish the harm. Public welfare offense liability is an 
ineffective and unjustified sanction unless its imposition fixes the 
non-evacuation problem. The only way imposing strict criminal 
liability conceivably addresses these harms is by deterring non-
evacuation behavior in the first place. However, in the case of 
Vulnerable Stayers, facilitation, rather than deterrence, is what is 
needed, and in the case of Willful Stayers, the deterrent effect of the 
law is questionable. 
Compliance, or the lack of, with New York’s statute criminalizing 
non-evacuation during Hurricane Sandy is illustrative.186 One factor 
                                                                                                                                     
place in lawmaking. In the non-evacuation context, this raises the question of whether the self-
harm of non-evacuation is an appropriate basis for prohibiting the conduct. For more on this 
topic, see Jorissen, supra note 154, at 616. For a general discussion on the validity of 
paternalism, see David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519 
(1988); Eric Tennen, Is the Constitution in Harm’s Way? Substantive Due Process and Criminal 
Law, 8 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 3 (2004). 
 186. See, e.g., Nathaniel Herz, Don’t Blame Irene, THE N.Y. WORLD (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/11/08/dont-blame-irene/. 
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indicating compliance was the number of citizens who took refuge in 
shelters.187 While 9,600 people took refuge in shelters in 2011 when 
Hurricane Irene hit (before the law was effective), only 6,100 people 
took refuge in shelters as Hurricane Sandy approached in 2012 (after 
the law was effective).188 If the possibility of criminal sanctions 
effectively deterred people, presumably more people would have 
sought refuge in shelters during Sandy. 
Several studies have found that the criminal law is, on the whole, 
an ineffective deterrent to criminal conduct.189 Potential offenders 
are often unaware of the law.190 If they know the law, they make their 
decision based on a cost-benefit analysis, and because potential 
offenders perceive a low likelihood of detection, this analysis 
commonly encourages violation.191 Even if that analysis urges 
compliance, criminals still commonly fail to comply because of 
overriding social or situational influences.192 Although preventing 
non-evacuation through deterrence would guard the safety of first 
responders and non-evacuators, imposing criminal liability cannot 
achieve that objective when it fails to provide Vulnerable Stayers with 
the choice and fails to deter Willful Stayers from making the choice. 
c. Prosecutorial discretion and criminal defenses. Prosecutorial 
discretion could ameliorate some of the problems identified above, 
such as the prosecution of victims like Ms. Dresch or the prosecution 
of Vulnerable Stayers. The initial decision to charge an individual 
largely depends on the prosecutor’s discretion.193 To justify 
                                                                                                                                     
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal 
Justice in the Information Age: A Punishment Theory Paradox, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 683 
(2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Social Science 
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) [hereinafter Robinson, Does Criminal 
Law Deter?]; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).  
 190. Robinson, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 189, at 174.  
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995). 
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prosecution, the prosecutor only needs to establish that there is 
probable cause to believe the accused committed the offense.194 
Prosecutorial discretion is an important limitation on the law’s 
potential to indict innocent or undeserving individuals: it is the 
precise instrument that comes to mind when dealing with cases such 
as Ms. Dresch.195 
While prosecutorial discretion may enable undeserving or 
unremarkable defendants to escape prosecution, there are reasons 
relying on this principle is undesirable. The depth of freedom in 
plotting a prosecutorial course necessarily translates into a great deal of 
power.196 At least one author has suggested that it “gives prosecutors 
more power than any other criminal justice officials, with practically 
no corresponding accountability to the public they serve.”197 Because 
the decision to bring a charge, dismiss a charge already brought, or 
forgo charging altogether is, for the most part, immune to judicial 
review,198 the discretion is especially prone to abuse. 
Research showing prosecutors’ propensity to make racially based 
decisions makes reliance on discretion particularly alarming. 
“Evidence collected in scholarly articles indicates that the race of the 
defendant and the victim sometimes affects the prosecutor’s decision 
to file charges at all, her selection of the severity of charges to file, 
and which charges to file.”199 The fact that so many African American 
defendants and victims lack power or are otherwise disadvantaged 
increases the likelihood that prosecutors will “treat them less well 
                                                                                                                                     
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20 (1998) (“One easily thinks of the prototypical case of 
a poor man who steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving family. Few would question the 
propriety or fairness of a prosecutorial decision to dismiss criminal charges against this criminal 
defendant. Such a decision could not be made in the absence of some level of discretion.”). 
 196. Meares, supra note 193, at 863. 
 197. Davis, supra note 195, at 18 (citations omitted). 
 198. Meares, supra note 193, at 862. 
 199. Id. at 888–89 (citing Randolph N. Stone, The Criminal Justice System: Unfair and 
Ineffective, 2 HARV. J. AFR. AM. PUB. POL’Y 53, 63–64 (1993)); see also Davis, supra note 195, 
at 16–17 (“[B]ecause prosecutors play such a dominant and commanding role in the criminal 
justice system through the exercise of broad, unchecked discretion, their role in the 
complexities of racial inequality in the criminal process is inextricable and profound.”). 
CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
542 
 
than whites.”200  Because so many non-evacuators, especially 
Vulnerable Stayers, are part of minority communities, prosecutorial 
discretion seems to be an inadequate protection against abuse. 
In the event prosecutors elect to prosecute individuals like Ms. 
Dresch or Vulnerable Stayers, a criminal defense of justification or 
excuse may also serve as protection. Justification concedes that the 
defendant committed the act, but claims that the act was not 
wrongful.201 The relevant justification defense is that of necessity. 
This arises when natural forces confront a person in an emergency 
with a choice of two evils.202 If violating the law will cause relatively 
less harm than complying with it, the act is considered a necessity 
and is, therefore, justified.203 Excuse, on the other hand, concedes 
that the defendant committed the act, but seeks “to avoid the 
attribution of the act to the actor.”204 An excuse can shield liability 
when the actor’s ability to make unencumbered decisions or to 
meaningfully control his behavior is impaired.205 
While it is not hard to imagine how these defenses could apply in 
various non-evacuation circumstances, several factors impair their 
ability to protect defendants. First, in the evacuation context, 
application of these defenses would be novel. Necessity tends to deal 
with “the destruction of another’s property to prevent further 
destruction to more property or to save lives,”206 while excuse tends 
to involve defenses such as duress, insanity, and immaturity.207 
Second, the successful assertion of such defenses will often require 
the intervention of counsel. Notably, “the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not apply to all misdemeanors,” and may therefore not 
                                                                                                                                     
 200. Davis, supra note 195, at 32. 
 201. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (2000). 
 202. Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and 
What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 813 (2004). 
 203. Id. 
 204. FLETCHER, supra note 201.  
 205. See Milhizer, supra note 202, at 818. 
 206. Jorissen, supra note 154, at 611.  
 207. Milhizer, supra note 202, at 816 n.469.  
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apply to non-evacuation charges.208 While the Supreme Court has 
ruled that “any imposed or suspended sentence of incarceration 
triggers the right to counsel,”209 crimes that merely impose fines, 
such as non-evacuation in some instances, do not trigger the right.210 
Furthermore, “a Bureau of Justice report found that 28% of jail 
inmates charged with misdemeanors stated, when interviewed, that 
they had no counsel.”211 Vulnerable Stayers are likely to be 
vulnerable in many areas of their lives. They are more likely to not 
have the luxury of hiring attorneys to defend their cases. Although 
public defenders may be provided,212 defendants may not understand 
the significance of accepting such assistance and may waive that 
right. While prosecutorial discretion and criminal defenses may aid in 
protecting innocent or indigent offenders, these protections as they 
apply to the non-evacuation problem are inadequate to fully address 
the potential inequities. 
3. Symbolic impact 
Even if these laws are not enforced through traditional means, 
such as arrest and relocation and prosecution, they have an 
expressive impact upon those within and without its jurisdiction. At 
the outset, it is important to note that “[p]revailing norms, like 
preferences and beliefs, are not a presocial given but a product of a 
complex set of social forces,” and law is only one of those forces.213 
Thus, the issues to be discussed are not solely the product of the 
laws at issue, but laws certainly contribute. To fully assess the 
                                                                                                                                     
 208. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 310 (2011). 
 209. Id. at 311 & n.144 (citing Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002)). 
 210. See id. at 311 & n.146 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979)). 
 211. Id. at 312. The survey does not indicate the demographics of those surveyed, so it is 
not entirely clear whether the survey results reflect an inequity for one group over another. 
However, even assuming that the results reflect an equal impact along racial and socio-
economic lines, the results still suggest that many persons would be devoid of the legal counsel 
essential to successfully mounting a legal defense. 
 212. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). 
 213. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2026 (1996). 
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expressive impact, I will consider the norms that criminalization of 
non-evacuation communicates and how social enforcement of those 
norms impacts non-evacuators. 
The basic message criminalizing non-evacuation sends is that 
people should evacuate. This is, overall, an uncontroversial directive. 
However, its simplicity makes it dangerous. If the norm is simply 
that one must evacuate when ordered to do so, this fails to account 
for the litany of legitimate reasons people disobey. One would hope 
that the public could appreciate the complicated plight of those 
facing an evacuation decision, but research suggests that the public 
fails to discriminate.214 One study already mentioned here215 showed 
that two classes of post-Katrina observers—relief workers and lay 
observers—condemned non-evacuators by “using one particular set 
of assumptions about the culturally ‘right’ way to act.”216 As 
discussed previously, the non-evacuators viewed their decision 
differently, and for good reason, citing a number of option-limiting 
factors.217 This study supports the conclusion that, generally, the 
public fails to account for the nuanced circumstances that prevent 
compliance with evacuation orders. 
The indiscriminate condemnation is troubling for several reasons. 
First, unlike traditional enforcement, the public is not obligated to 
give due process before issuing judgment and condemnation.218 This 
means there is no obligatory fact-finding, investigation, or benefit of 
doubt. “[S]urely an offender cannot be said to deserve the vague 
punishment given by ill-informed societal condemnation any more 
than an innocent person deserves the culpability judgment of an ill-
informed factfinder.”219 
                                                                                                                                     
 214. See generally Stephens et al., supra note 8. 
 215. See id.  
 216. See id. at 884.  
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 145–48. 
 218. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1819 
(2001) (citing Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991)). 
 219. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 
209 (2009). 
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Second, while expressive enforcement may be constructive for 
Willful Stayers, its indiscriminate application against Vulnerable 
Stayers reinforces prejudicial attitudes. For Willful Stayers, the factors 
emboldening them to stay are not as compelling, and social 
condemnation following a disaster may convince them to evacuate 
the next time a disaster strikes. However, in the case of Vulnerable 
Stayers, expressive enforcement cannot be productive because 
Vulnerable Stayers need help, not coercion or reprobation. Rather 
than encouraging evacuation, condemnation will simply bolster and 
further solidify the prejudices already directed at these citizens. 
When society expresses its derogation for non-evacuators, those 
feelings of derogation will likely spill over from the act to the actor, 
especially if the observer already holds prejudices associated with the 
actor’s characteristics. 
To understand how this process works and why it matters, we 
need to ascertain the qualities associated with non-evacuators 
generally, the actual qualities of Vulnerable Stayers, and the 
stereotypes already associated with Vulnerable Stayers. The public 
generally views non-evacuation as a passive, irresponsible, careless, 
and stubborn act.220 Lay observers, relief workers,221 and government 
officials222 embrace this sentiment. With respect to the actual 
qualities of Vulnerable Stayers, they are presumably vulnerable 
because they are poor, uneducated, or otherwise underprivileged. As 
history has shown, those falling into this category are too often racial 
minorities. In Hurricane Katrina, for example, 
[i]t was a largely African American and often poor populace that 
had lived in the areas most vulnerable to the collapse of the levees, 
that proved unable to secure transportation to evacuate the city, 
and that was now scrambling in frightening conditions to secure 
scarce aid for their families, their friends, and themselves.223 
                                                                                                                                     
 220. See Stephens et al., supra note 8, at 880.  
 221. Id. at 884.  
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 9–14.  
 223. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
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While it is possible that misdirected social condemnation may 
create new stigmas about new groups of people, it is more likely that 
it will reinforce those stigmas already in place. In light of this 
country’s history of racism, it is not hard to imagine where those 
stigmas exist. Research has shown that whites “view African-
Americans as a violent black underclass, associating traits like 
aggressiveness, violence, and hostility with their stereotypical 
opinions.”224 In fact, “for many whites, crime policy attitudes are 
fueled by their racial beliefs.”225 “Research has also demonstrated 
that even whites who consider themselves to be nonbiased and 
liberal nonetheless harbor unconscious racist attitudes and behave in 
racist fashion toward blacks.”226 
Combining these findings, when the negative perceptions of 
the act of non-evacuation gradually become integrated into the 
actor, the public will likely view both the act and the actor 
negatively. But when the actor is already the target of prejudice, the 
social condemner feels validated not only in his condemnation of 
the act, but also in his preexisting prejudices. By making non-
evacuation a crime, legislatures enable the public to reinforce 
established stereotypes. 
Even if non-evacuation laws are not enforced through traditional 
means, they will have a negative impact on non-evacuators. This is 
particularly true for Vulnerable Stayers who are condemned and 
further marginalized for an innocent act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In late 2005, a Select Bipartisan Committee formed by the U.S. 
House of Representatives investigated the failures of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 224. Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, No New Orleanians Left Behind: An Examination of 
the Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Minorities, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1153, 1169–70 
(2006) (quoting John Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role 
of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 393 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. (quoting Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive 
in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 426 (2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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governmental response to Katrina.227 Throughout these hearings, 
two views emerged concerning the purpose of mandatory evacuation 
orders: (1) evacuation orders trigger the obligation to provide for 
people, and (2) evacuation “orders entail deciding for people.”228 
Despite recognizing these dual obligations during the hearing, 
“[t]he view that the government bore an obligation not only to 
provide for the public but also to compel them to evacuate did not 
appear in the committee’s final report.”229 If policymakers are going 
to effect a meaningful change in evacuation behavior, they must 
begin by adopting policies that account for both of these obligations. 
Criminalization ultimately goes too far in advancing the 
deciding-for obligation, and does so at the expense of the providing-
for responsibility. While encouraging evacuation is a worthy goal, 
criminalization frames non-evacuation solely as a malfunction of 
human agency, and thus fails to address some of the most 
fundamental obstacles. A substantial group of citizens fail to evacuate 
not because they lack adequate incentive, but because they lack 
adequate resources. These citizens need help, not punishment. 
Criminalization, rather than providing aid, affixes blame to victims, 
diminishes the role of governmental shortcomings, and threatens to 
further burden those already reduced to destitution by the disaster. 
While North Carolina’s public welfare offense is designed to avert 
harm rather than affix blame, it does so at the risk of penalizing 
vulnerable, and ultimately innocent, citizens. Furthermore, non-
evacuation primarily creates self-harm, and criminalization fails to 
mitigate that harm by inadequately deterring Willful Stayers and 
altogether neglecting Vulnerable Stayers. Even if government 
officials do not enforce the law in a traditional sense, the law’s 
expressive impact will negatively contribute to public attitudes of 
non-evacuators, especially Vulnerable Stayers. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 227. Fairchild et al., supra note 20, at 960. 
 228. Id. at 960 
 229. Id. at 961.  
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At its best, criminalizing non-evacuation encourages the status 
quo, and at its worst, it has potential to exacerbate the non-
evacuation problem. 
 
Brandon Curtis* 
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